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1 Introduction
Milton Friedman once remarked that a country cannot have both free legal migration
and a generous welfare state. One of the reasons for that is unskilled legal migrants
receive more welfare benets than their income tax contribution. Besides, it is
commonly believed that a mass of unskilled legal migrants who acquire the right to
vote lead to a larger welfare state; that is, more income tax redistribution in their
favor. This paper presents a theory that shows this may not necessarily be the case
especially when we look at internal migration ows.
The geographical distribution of voters determines the elected representatives
of a constituency. Any change in the voting population due, for example, to age-
ing, migration, relocation in urban areas, the extension of the voting rights and
citizenship contributes to shape public policies.
Some examples of changes in the electorate are the migration between East and
West Germany as well as its capital Berlin after reunication or between North and
South of Spain and Italy after the second world war. There are also policies that
impact directly on the voting population such as the extension of the franchise or
the recognition of political rights to landed migrants after a certain number of years
they have been living and working in the country.
A simple way to deal with this issue is to use the median voter approach. Any
change in the voting populace changes the median voter and has, therefore, a di-
rect impact on public policy as explained by Meltzer and Richard (1981). They
argue that the extension of the franchise causes the election of a poorer median
voter who will increase redistributive public spending. As pointed out in Giuranno
(2009), Meltzer and Richards logic applies to a one-region economy. However, most
countries, as well as urban areas, are divided into regions and electoral districts.
Therefore, in a multi-region economy the national median voter approach cannot
explain public policy as regionally elected representatives have to form a central
legislature and set policy through a collegial bargaining mechanism.
The impact on the size of government of demographic changes in a multi-
jurisdictional economy has not been adequately studied yet. In this paper we explic-
itly address this issue by considering a multi-regional economy where policy decisions
are made by bargaining by the regional median voters in the central legislature. In
this context, whether a group of individuals vote in one or in another jurisdiction
may have important policy implications. Inter-regional migrants who acquire the
right to vote in their nal destination a¤ect the collective choice mechanism by mov-
ing the median voters in both the regions where they come from and where they
end up.
When people move they may acquire di¤erent individual incomes. Therefore,
inter-regional mobility a¤ects the distribution of income within and among regions
and the average income of the whole economy. Votersmobility leads to regional
pivotal voters who may be either relatively richer or poorer with respect to the per-
capita income of the economy. In the collective choice mechanism here developed,
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the income gap among regional median voters characterises the dimension of the
inter-regional redistributive conict. We study how inter-regional migration either
mitigates or deteriorates both the intra- and inter-regional redistributive conicts
and how the latter inuence the size, equity and e¢ ciency of public spending.
Our theory complements the classic theory of the determinants of the size of
government and scal redistribution which depends on the level of income inequality.
Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) argued that in a one-jurisdictional polity the more
skewed the distribution of income, the larger the di¤erence between the median
and the mean income and the higher the size of government. Giuranno (2009)
showed that in a multi-jurisdiction structure the larger the inter-regional income
inequality, the lower the government size because of the worsening inter-regional
redistributive conicts. Thus, there are two conicting e¤ects. One is due to intra-
regional inequality as in Meltzer and Richard (1981) and the other to inter-regional
inequality as in Giuranno (2009). Now, can the two conicting e¤ects be linked to
each other? As discussed in Giuranno (2009) without providing a formal analysis,
the two e¤ects interact. In this paper, we address this issue formally and nd that
what really matters are the two income gaps, one between the income of regional
median voters and the second between median votersincome and the average income
of the whole economy.
In our framework, migration does not inuence the election of the national me-
dian voter as in Dolmas and Hu¤man (2004), it rather inuences the election of the
jurisdictional median voters that will form the central legislature and set policy by
bargaining.
We show that peoples mobility, as in general any demographic change, decreases
government size when it leads to the election of regional median voters that are
simultaneously richer relative to the average income of the whole economy. This
may be the case, for example, of the brain-drain that has strongly characterised
the migration from the poorer South to the richer North in the last twenty years in
Italy, where reducing public spending has become a priority in the political agenda.
Di Cintio and Grassi (2011) found empirical evidence that a large number of skilled
workers from the poorer Italian regions who just gained their University degree move
to richer regions to increase their income. Before migrating, their incomes are lower
than the income of the regional median voter. Once they migrate to a rich region,
skilled workers can gain a wage above that of the median voter of the destination
region. As a result, the brain-drain from a poorer to a richer region alters the
composition of the voting populace and may produce regional median voters that
are simultaneously richer in all regions. We nd that when all regional median voters
become simultaneously richer, they will unanimously agree to decrease the size of
government. This result can be considered as an extension of Meltzer and Richards
(1981) e¤ect to a multi-region economy.
Similarly, we show that peoples mobility increases government size when it pro-
duces regional median voters that are simultaneously poorer relative to the per-
capita income. This happens, for example, when workers who are richer than the
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regional median voter move to a region where they become poorer than the lo-
cal median voter even if their private income has increased. Davies and Winers
(2011) empirical evidence provides a di¤erent example. They showed that the US
immigration restrictions that came into e¤ect in 1968 for more than two decades
reduced Canadian emigration. This, in turn, may have contributed to increase both
economic inequality within provinces and the size of government in Canada.
Migration worsens inter-regional redistributive conicts when the income gap
among regional median voters either increases or decreases. In these cases, the
impact of migration on centralised public spending is more ambiguous. To illustrate
the case, we consider a two-region economy and rst assume that inter-regional
mobility leads to a lower income disparity between regional median voters. This
happens when voters who live in the poorer region and earn an income below that
of the regional median voter migrate and acquire the right to vote in the rich region
where they still earn a salary below that of the regional median voter. This is the
case, for example, of the massive migration of unskilled workers from the South to
the North of Italy during the fties and sixties. In this case, low income workers
left the poorer region to earn a better salary in the rich region. Unskilled workers
usually have an income to the left of the regional distribution of wealth and, often,
to the left of the median voter income. Therefore, if unskilled workers move from
poorer to rich regions and their income increases, but remains below that of the
median voter of the destination region, the perturbation in the electorate is such
that the median voter of the poorer region becomes relatively richer and the median
voter of the rich region relatively poorer. We show that when mobility leads to a
smaller income disparity in median votersincomes, public spending increases if the
income e¤ect is more relevant for the median voter of the rich region. This is because
the reduction of inter-regional redistributive conicts makes the median voter of the
rich region more willing to increase government spending as her private marginal
cost declines. However, if the income e¤ect is more relevant for the poorer region, a
smaller income inequality leads to more ambiguous results. Specically, the median
voter of the poorer region is now richer and she may obtain an increase in public
spending since this is now also the will of the richer median voter. However, the
poorer median voter faces a conict of interest as she has to balance her will to
increase public spending with an increase in her private marginal cost.
Inter-regional migration may also worsen inter-regional redistributive conicts
when the income gap between the resulting median voters increases. This happens
when the median voter of the rich region is a richer one and that of the poorer region
is a relatively poorer one. This can be the case of migration of skilled workers from
the poorer to a richer region when workers do not migrate just as soon as they obtain
their graduate or postgraduate degrees. In this case, skilled workers of the poorer
region rst spend sometime in their region where they gain an income above that of
the local median voter and then decide to migrate to a richer region where they still
earn a salary above that of the regional median voter. We show that if the income
e¤ect on the regional median voters is more relevant for the median voter of the rich
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region, then government size declines as the rich region is the one that constraints
public spending in this case. On the contrary, if the income e¤ect is more relevant
for the median voter of the poorer region, then the policy outcome is ambiguous. In
this case, the marginal tax paid by the poorer median voter declines and she would
be happy to increase public spending. However, this e¤ect has to be strong enough
to convince the richer median voter to increase the size of government.
This paper also studies the relation between migration, equity and the e¢ ciency
of public spending. We consider two cases. In the rst case, both median voters
have an income below that of the average income. While, in the second case, the
average income is smaller than the rich median voters income and higher than the
poorers income. According to empirical evidence (see Meltzer and Richard 1981,
1983 and others) we can rule other hypothesis out of the game. We nd over-
provision of public goods and services when both median voters are poorer than
the average income voter. Instead, when the rich median voter is richer than the
average income voter we may obtain either over or under-provision. In any case,
when we compare the bargaining outcome with the social optimum, we nd that
migration leads to e¢ ciency in public spending as the distribution of income becomes
uniformly distributed within and among regions. Therefore, in this model there is
no trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency as they tend to go together.
1.1 Related literature
Papers that study the link between migration and redistributive policies under sev-
eral aspects are mainly based on the choice of the national median voter. There
are a few papers that study the issue within a two-jurisdiction context. Most of
these papers look at decentralised policy among independent jurisdictions where lo-
cal median voters set policy in a Nash equilibrium set-up. We advance the existing
literature by explicitly developing a framework where jurisdictional median voters
cooperate over policy in a unitary state.
Furthermore, most existing literature considers two discrete levels of income as-
sociated to skilled and unskilled workers for both natives and migrants. This in turn
implies that, the economy may have only two types of median voters and polices. In
our paper the distribution of income is continuous and, therefore, migration always
changes the jurisdictional median voters and the resulting redistributive policies.
Besides Migration, there are many phenomena that lead to changes in the voting
population, which a¤ect redistributive policies. Razin et al. (2002a) considered the
case of population aging that a¤ects median voters policy choices in an overlap-
ping generation model of intra- and intergenerational transfers. Husted and Kenny
(1997) found empirical evidence that the expansion of the voting franchise led to big-
ger government. Acemouglu and Robinson (2000) and many others focused on the
case of the extension of the franchise. During the nineteenth century most Western
societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistribu-
tive programs. They argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic
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decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution.
Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions,
occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension
of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to re-
distribution. In other words, redistribution is an end rather than a direct means for
maintaining the political status quo.
Regional governmentspublic policy may have an e¤ect not only on international
migration, but also on inter-regional relocations, as the empirical evidence on Cana-
dian data provided by Day and Winer (2012) suggests. The relation between the
welfare state as a magnet for skilled and unskilled migration, which is the oppo-
site kind of problem dealt in this paper, was also addressed by numerous authors as
Gramlich and Laren (1984) and Borjas (1999). Gramlich and Laren (1984) and Bor-
jas (1999) found empirical evidence that migrants move mainly towards high benet
states. Cohen and Razin (2008), Razin and Wahba (2011, 2012), Razin et al. (2011
cp. 1 and 2) and others argued that welfare, rather than labor, induced migration
constraints the growth of the welfare benets in rich countries. Therefore, migration
policies should be implemented to limit unskilled migration as it inicts a burden
on the welfare state. On the contrary, skilled migration should be encouraged as it
may help the nances of the welfare state.
The relation between migration and the welfare state level was addressed by
Razin et al. (2011, cp. 3) and Hansen (2003). Razin et al. (2011, cp. 3) showed how
the generosity of the welfare state can be a¤ected by exogenous skilled and unskilled
migration ows. Hansen (2003) analysed the welfare choice of the median voters of
two independent countries under three di¤erent set-ups: uncoordinated, coordinated
and leader-follower models. Immigrants are inuenced in their relocation decision by
welfare benets in host countries and do not acquire the right to vote. Therefore,
median voters, who never change, set policy by anticipating the impact on their
utility of welfare driven immigration.
Armenter and Ortega (2010) ask whether inter-jurisdictional worker mobility
has undermined the ability of U.S. states to redistribute income. They consider
a multi-jurisdictional economy where both migration decisions and redistribution
policies are jointly determined by local scal authorities, which are interested in
maximizing regional welfare. Taking into account heterogeneous regions and skilled
and unskilled workers with idiosyncratic migration costs, they nd that worker mo-
bility has induced substantial convergence, but no downward pressure, in tax rates.
A main di¤erence between this paper and Armenter and Ortega (2010) is that we
consider policy decision made by the central scal authority.
Benhabib (1996) points out that economic models that consider the migration
policy chosen by the natives population do not take into account that migrants
may acquire the right to vote and contribute to decide future public spending. An
economic model where migrants vote was developed by Razin et al. (2002b) who
found that an increase in the number of migrants can lead to a lower tax burden
depending on whether the median voter is a native-born skilled or unskilled person
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or a migrant. They consider the scal leakage from native-born to the migrants
in a one-region model with exogenous and external migration. Mayer (2007) also
examines the e¤ect of immigration on the extend of income redistribution via ma-
jority voting when immigrants can vote. The tax outcome depends on the size of
the native skilled and unskilled groups. The initial amount of redistribution in the
economy determines the skill composition of immigrants, which in turn changes the
size of skilled and unskilled voters. In our model, we consider the case of internal
migration in a multi-region economy without dividing the voting population into
skills or homogenous classes.
Razin et al. (2012) develops a dynamic political-economy theory that highlights
how skilled and unskilled migration inuences inter- and intra-generation redistrib-
ution conicts of a typical welfare system.
Boerner and Silke (2007) focuses on the power of the non-voter on the welfare
state level. They argue that in one-jurisdiction economy with emigration the com-
position of the constituency changes. This increases the political inuence of the
less mobile part of the population and, at the same time, reduces tax revenues as
less people contribute.
Within the purview of a general equilibrium setting comprising individuals, the
local and the central governments, Epple and Romer (1991) study how much redis-
tribution occurs when only the local governments can have tax transfer instruments,
individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are
fully aware of the migration e¤ects of the redistributive policies. Their model pre-
dicts that local redistribution induce sorting of the population, with the poorest
households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution. While
the threat of out-migration a¤ects the potential for redistribution, their results sug-
gest that signicant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible.
Wildasin (1994) analyses redistribution policies that transfer income between
owners of immobile factors of production and workers in a given region. The menu
of income distribution possibilities attainable through tax/transfer policy in the
presence of labour mobility is characterized. Simple general equilibrium analysis
shows that migration can lead to Pareto-inferior outcomes in the destination region
if immigrants are the beneciaries of redistributive transfers. All residents of the
destination region may gain, however, if transfer payments are also paid to workers
in the source region so as to reduce the level of immigration.
Dolmas and Hu¤man (2003) study several general equilibrium models in which
the agents in an economy must decide on the appropriate level of immigration into
the country. Immigration does not enter directly into the native agents utility
functions, and natives have identical preferences over consumption goods. However,
natives may be endowed with di¤erent amounts of capital, which alone gives rise to
alternative levels of desired immigration. They show that the nativespreferences
over desired levels of immigration are inuenced by the prospect that new immi-
grants will be voting in the future, which may lead to higher taxation to nance
government spending from which they will benet.
7
Inter-jurisdictional Migration and the Size of Government
They also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the
distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant
pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can all have a
dramatic e¤ect on the equilibrium immigration and taxation policies. Both their
model and the empirical evidence support the notion that inequality can lead to
reduced immigration. The results also suggest that opposition to immigration can be
mitigated by enhanced capital mobility, as well as from removing some of the benets
that immigrants ultimately receive, either in the form of government transfers, or
the franchise to vote.
A reason why immigration policy is such a contested issue is that often immi-
grants acquire the right to vote and, hence, may a¤ect future policies. With the
help of a dynamic, general equilibrium model of immigration policy, Ortega (2004)
contends that there is a trade-o¤ between skill-complementary immigration and the
resulting shift in political power. In each period, a heterogeneously skilled pop-
ulation chooses an immigration policy by majority vote. Voters anticipate that
immigration a¤ects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate.
Ortega shows that a reasonably parameterized version of the model is consistent
with the main features of US immigration.
Salmon (2012) remarks the "need to devote more attention to the e¤ects of mo-
bility on the composition of the electorate". In his recent survey, Salmon addresses
the issues of mobility manipulation to shape the electorate, which can occur either
between the center and peripheries of a metropolitan area (Mingant and Salmon
1986 and 1988, Glaser and Shleifer 2005, Brueckner and Glaser 2008) or between
jurisdictions (Caplan 2001, Brosio and Revelli 2003b). Mingant and Salmon (1986,
1988), Glaeser and Shleifer (2005) and Brueckner and Glazer (2008) provide exam-
ples of mobility manipulation, which shapes the distribution of the electorate and
the incumbents probability to be re-elected.
Brosio and Revelli (2003b) study the assignment of income distribution policy in
the presence of migration. They built their theory by introducing migration in Brosio
and Revellis (2003a) overlapping generations median voter model in a multi-tiered
structure of government. In their framework, jurisdictional median voters change
over time. However, current median voters may incentivize migration ows that
a¤ect policy choice of future median voters.
To the best of our knowledge there does not exist theoretical literature explaining
the relation between migration and the size of the public sector in a multi-regional
economy when policy is chosen by bargaining among regional representatives.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section denes the benchmark model
and reproduces a standard result rst due to Meltzer and Richard (1981). Section
three discusses the relation between inter-regional migration and majority voting
outcome. Sections four and ve present the results and six the conclusions. The
appendix contains derivations and proofs.
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2 The economic framework without migration
Consider two jurisdictions, or regions, comprising a state.1 In jurisdiction 1 there
are N1 people and in jurisdiction 2 N2 people, with N1+N2 = N and N normalized
to one. There are two goods in this economy, a public good g and a private good y,
which can be thought of as individual income or initial endowment. The central gov-
ernment provides the public good uniformly across regions and levies a proportional
income-tax t, bounded by 0  t  1, on individual income y in order to nance the
provision of g. We assume, for simplicity, that the unit cost of g is one, so that if
the size is g the cost of the public sector is just one times g. Besides, government
spending is provided equally to everyone. The government budget constraint is then
simply
ty = g, (1)
where y =
NX
h=1
yh=N is the average income of the all economy.
Each citizen h has the same quasi-linear preferences over private consumption,
(1  t) yh, and publicly provided goods g. We can now write the policy preferences
of a citizen h as follows,
uh = (1  t) yh +H (g) = (y   g) y
h
y
+H (g) , (2)
where the public spending benet function H (g) is increasing, smooth concave and
satises the endpoint Inada condition.
In what follows, we analyse the social optimum solution, the regional rst-best
policy under majority voting and nally the legislature equilibrium. Then, we study
how a change in the distribution of the electorate due to inter-regional relocations
or migration impacts on the legislature equilibrium policy.
2.1 The social optimum
We rst study the social optimum that can be interpreted as the policy outcome of
a benevolent central planner. We suppose that the central planner maximizes the
following additive social welfare function:2
max
ge
NX
h=1
uh. (3)
The e¢ cient government size, ge, satises the familiar Samuelsonian condition,
H 0 (ge) =
X
yh
y
. (4)
1Here, we focus on the territorial dimension of the model. Alternatively, we can think about
two distinct ethnic, religious, incomes or other kinds of groups.
2As in Besley and Coate (2003), we assume that the endowments of the median voters and of
all the taxpayers are large enough to meet their tax obligations.
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Equation (4) states that the social marginal benet is equal to the social marginal
cost in equilibrium. The Samuelsonian condition leads to the following simple equa-
tion
H 0 (ge) = 1, (5)
which means that, in equilibrium, the marginal benet is equal to the marginal cost.
Clearly, the distribution of income does not inuence the central planners de-
cision. Therefore, any change in either the inter or intra-regional distribution of
income does not inuence the social optimum outcome.
2.2 The regional rst best under majority voting
Individual preferences are concave in policy, implying that every citizen has a unique
preferred policy that satises the following rst order condition
H 0
 
gh

=
yh
y
. (6)
We assume that voters vote sincerely. Under majority rule, the voter with median
income is decisive. Furthermore, income is the only dimension of heterogeneity
among citizens. Therefore, voters with incomes below that of the median voter
prefer a higher level of public spending and redistribution. On the contrary, voters
with incomes above that of the decisive voter desire less public spending and less
redistribution.
The distribution of income di¤ers between the two jurisdictions. We denote by
yi, with i = 1; 2, the income of the median voter of region i and, to simplify the
exposition, assume that median voter 1 is richer than median voter 2, y1  y2.3
The regional median voters form the centralized legislature, which has to deter-
mine the size of the public sector. Once the legislature decides the dimension of
g, the government budget constraint is automatically determined by equation (1).4
Accordingly, the tax paid by median voter i is tyi =
yi
y
g, with i = 1; 2. Thus, we
write the utility function of median voter i as follows,
ui = yi   yi
y
g +H (g) , with i = 1; 2. (7)
Policy is chosen by bargaining by the regional median voters in the centralised
legislature. Before looking at the bargaining solution, we rst consider the rst best
policy outcome for a regional median voter, which is the unique solution to the
following equation:
H 0
 
gDi

=
yi
y
, with i = 1; 2. (8)
3When this condition is violated, we have a symmetric situation. So the assumption does not
have any bearing on the end results.
4The model could also be extended by introducing a di¤erent tax-rate for the two jurisdiction
so that the legislature can bargain over g, t1 and t2. In this case, budget constraint would be
g = N1t1y1 + N2t2y2, where y1 and y2 are the mean income of jurisdiction 1 and jurisdiction 2
respectly.
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Solution (8) states that if the median voter of region i is, let us say, a non-benevolent
dictator she would choose gi such that her private marginal benet is equal to her pri-
vate marginal cost. The non benevolent dictator is a free-rider. She always reduces
public expenditure when her private marginal cost increases; that is, @gDi =@
yi
y
< 0.
She increases the provision of g when either the mean income increases or her private
income declines because this reduces her marginal cost.
If we compare equations (8) and (5) we can conclude that the regional rst best
under majority voting equals the social optimum when median and mean incomes
are the same. Otherwise, we get over provision when yi < y and under provision
when yi > y.
2.3 The legislature bargaining equilibrium
In this section we will analyze the public policy outcome when decisions are not made
by a central planner or a non-benevolent dictator, but directly by the jurisdictional
median voters in the central legislature. Here, median voters form a government
and choose policy through negotiation.5
We assume that if no agreement is achieved, the government will not be able to
implement any public good, i.e., g = 0.6 Therefore, the utility each representative
obtains in the event of disagreement is udi = yi, with i = 1; 2. That is, everybody
consumes entirely his or her private income. In order to reach an agreement both
median voters must have positive net gains from implementing g. In formula, it
must be ui   udi > 0, which implies  yiy g +H (g) > 0.
We denote the net gain from reaching an agreement of median voter i with the
symbol i, such that
i = ui   udi =  
yi
y
g +H (g) . (9)
The net gain from reaching an agreement is equal to the net private gain minus the
net private cost and represents the private net benet if an agreement is reached
on g. The net gain from cooperating on the provision of g is smaller for the richer
median voter; that is,
1  2. (10)
Median voters have the same net gains when they have the same income yi and,
hence, the same marginal cost yi
y
.
Note that the marginal gain from cooperation is equal to the marginal utility,
here denoted as Mui; i.e.:
@i
@g
=  yi
y
+H 0 (g) =Mui. (11)
5Note that we assume that voters vote sincerely when they elect the regional representatives.
Relaxing this assumption would be an interesting extension of this paper, which we leave out for
future research.
6For a di¤erent threat point hypothesis see Giuranno (2010), where regional governments can
set policies if the central government cannot decide.
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Representatives choose the government size g by bargaining. We show that by
maximizing the following Nash bargaining condition:
max
g

 y1
y
g +H (g)

 y2
y
g +H (g)

. (12)
The rst order condition is:
 y1
y
+H 0 (g)
 y1
y
g +H (g)
+
 y2
y
+H 0 (g)
 y2
y
g +H (g)
= 0. (13)
Since the two denominators must be positive, it turns out thatMu1 < 0 andMu2 >
0 because marginal cost is higher for median voter 1. This shows that the bargaining
equilibrium is a compromise between median votersmost preferred policies; that
is, in equilibrium, median voter 1 would like a smaller provision of g and median
voter 2 would like more public consumption.
Furthermore, the ratio
 yi
y
+H 0 (g)
 yi
y
g +H (g)
, with i = 1; 2, (14)
can be interpreted as the elasticity with respect to g of the net gain from bargaining
for median voter i. The elasticity measures the percent change in gain from reaching
an agreement relative to public spending. It is easy to verify that as yi
y
increases
the ratio (14) declines. 7 This means that a median voter becomes more rigid in
the negotiation as she becomes richer relative to the mean. Therefore, she will be
less willing to reach an agreement over g.
3 Regional median voters and inter-regional migration
What happens to the three equilibrium conditions (5), (8) and (13) when the inter
and intra-regional distribution of voters change?
The electorate changes for many reasons such as, migration, inter-regional relo-
cation, aging and so on. A simple way to think about this issue is to consider the
case of inter-regional relocation or migration, which alters the composition of the
electorate without altering the total population. An individual who relocates, and
acquires the right to vote in the region where he or she ends up, causes an electoral
perturbation that changes the median voters of the two regions. What matters is
who becomes the regional median voter after a perturbation in the electorate has
taken place. Actually, from equilibrium conditions (8) and (13), it is evident that
what really matters is the income of the new regional median voters and the average
income or, simply, their ratio yi
y
, with i = 1; 2. For this reason, we denote by i =
yi
y
the "decisive" ratio between the income of median voter i and the mean income of
the whole economy.
7To see this, one has to consider that gH 0 (g) H (g) < 0 as proved in Chiang (1984, pp. 192-3).
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Following Razin et al. (2002b), we solve the model by assuming a continuous
relation between the level of inter-regional migration or relocation, m, and our key
parameter, , which determines a change in the regional median voters. The level
of migration m may have several interpretations. Razin et al. (2002b) consider m
as an exogenous binding quota or simply the number of migrants. We can simply
think aboutm as the number of migrants who move from region 1 to region 2 or vice
versa, where they acquire the voting right. Specically, when m = 0 the electorate
does not change as none moves between regions. As m increases, the median voters
of the two regions change; i.e.: @i
@m
Q 0, with i = 1; 2. The sign of @i
@m
depends on
the ranking in both regions of the income of the individuals who migrate.
Therefore, as in Dolmas and Hu¤man (2004), for a given value of m, we need
to conjecture the inter- and intra-regional distributions of income. To summarise,
when individuals migrate between regions and acquire the right to vote in the region
of destination, the following four conceivable analytical cases arise:
1) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0;
2) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0;
3) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0;
4) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0.
The central planners equilibrium condition, represented by equation (5), implies
no changes in public policy when the regional composition of the voting populace
changes. The reason is that the social marginal cost and benet do not change.
Instead, both the equilibrium condition (8) representing the regional median voters
rst best and the bargaining equilibrium (13) are a¤ected substantially.
Now, according to equation (8) if a small increase in m leads to a richer median
voter in region i relative to the mean, the rst best policy outcome for median
voter i results in a lower g. On the contrary, if a small increase in m leads to a
poorer median voter in region i relative to the mean, the rst best policy outcome
for median voter i is represented by a lower g as suggested by Meltzer and Richard
(1981).
We now study the impact on centralised public spending when there is a change
in the electorate in the four conceivable cases.
4 Centralised public spending under inter-regional migra-
tion
So far, we have argued that, in a world where income is the only element of het-
erogeneity among citizens, changes in the composition of jurisdictional electorates
modies the distribution of income inside jurisdictions leading to the election of
di¤erent jurisdictional median voters. This, in turn, implies that the redistributive
conict between regions assumes di¤erent intensities, which depends on whether the
new regional pivotal voters have either a lower or higher median-mean income ratio,
i.
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The following Lemma provides the key to solve the comparative statics for the
four conceivable cases.
Lemma 1 An increase in m leads to a larger public sector when the following rela-
tion holds:
dg
dm
> 0 when 
0
1 (m)
21
+
02 (m)
22
6 0. (15)
The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that the relation between inter-regional migration and the size
of the public sector depends on the sign of expression
01 (m)
21
+
02 (m)
22

, (16)
which is a function of the marginal change in the median votersincome ratio 0i (m)
due to migration and net gain i, with i = 1; 2. Obviously, we obtain dg
=dm = 0
when 01 (m) = 
0
2 (m) = 0. To understand the implications of the Lemma it is
necessary to study the four conceivable cases separately. We start from the case in
which both median voters have become richer relatively to the mean income voter
and the opposite case in which they have become relatively poorer.
Proposition 1 An increase in m that leads to richer regional median voters relative
to the national average causes a decrease in the size of g. Conversely, an increase in
m that leads to poorer regional median voters relative to the national average causes
an increase in the size g. In formulas,
dg
dm
 0 when 01 (m)  0 and 02 (m)  0 (17)
and
dg
dm
 0 when 01 (m)  0 and 02 (m)  0. (18)
The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma 1.
The Proposition considers two cases where the change in the voting populace
does not worsen the conict of interest between regional median voters. In the rst
case, an increase in the number of individuals who move from one region to the
other causes the election of relatively richer regional median voters who are both
more rigid with respect to public spending. Therefore, they will certainly agree
to reduce the size of the public sector. In the second case, both regional median
voters are poorer relative to the mean income. Therefore, they will agree to increase
redistributive public spending and have a bigger public sector. This Proposition
shows that when there is no substantial conict of interest between median voters
the classical Meltzer and Richard (1981) result is replicated in a multi-juridisction
economy.
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4.1 Migration and inter-regional convergence
What happens when migration worsen inter-regional redistributive conicts? We
answer this question in Propositions 2 and 3 and in Corollary 1.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0 in which an
increase in m leads the richer median voter to be a voter with a lower relative income
and the poorer median voter to be one with a higher relative income, the following
comparative static results apply:
dg
dm
> 0 if j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j , (19)
dg
dm
Q 0 if j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j . (20)
Besides, for the residual limit cases that have not been treated above, the following
comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
< 0 if 01 (m) = 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0, (21)
dg
dm
> 0 if 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) = 0. (22)
The proof is based on Lemma 1. Proposition 2 considers rst the case where
01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0. This, in turn, implies that
01(m)
21
< 0 and 
0
2(m)
22
> 0.
Given that relation (10) is always satised, as we assumed y1 > y2, expression (16) is
certainly negative when j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j. On the contrary, the sign of expression
(16) is ambiguous when j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j. Furthermore, cases (21) and (22) are
straightforward applications of Lemma 1.
In the case under consideration, the incomes of the median voters of the two
regions converge as median voter 1, the richer one by assumption, becomes poorer
with respect to the mean and median voter 2 becomes relatively richer. In this
situation, median voter 1 would like to increase the size of g because her marginal
cost is now lower. But, median voter 2 has a conict of interest. On the one hand
she would like to increase g as she can benet from redistributive public spending.
On the other, her marginal cost is now higher and this reduces redistribution in her
favour.
Case (19) in the above Proposition states that if the marginal change in  is
weakly greater for the richer median voter 1 , j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j, then g increases.
A bigger change in the gamma for median voter i means a bigger change in her
marginal cost. Therefore, as the marginal cost of the richer median voter declines,
her gain from cooperating 1 increases and she becomes more willing to agree on a
larger provision of g. On the contrary, as the marginal cost of the poorer median
voter increases, her gain from cooperation 2 declines and she becomes less willing
to agree on a larger g. Since, the change in the marginal cost is more relevant for
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the region with the highest median income, the interest of the richer median voter
is dominant in the renegotiation and the size of g will increase.
Case (20) states that if the marginal change in  is bigger for the poorer median
voter 2, j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j, then the change in government spending is ambiguous.
In order to understand the ambiguity, we recall that according to equilibrium con-
dition (13) median voter 2 always wants more public good provision than median
voter 1, in equilibrium. When median voter 2 is richer, she has to balance her will-
ingness to have more public spending with a higher marginal cost, which decreases
her gain from public good provision 2. Therefore, the nal outcome is ambiguous
and, as usual, depends on the sign of expression (16).
Case (21), instead, leads to an unambiguous result: dg

dm
< 0 when 01 (m) = 0
and 02 (m) > 0. The latter can be seen as a limit situation of case (20). It states
that government size declines if income convergence, induced by migration, does not
a¤ect the richer median voter. Case (22), can be read as a limit situation of case
(19). As expected, it states that government size unambiguously increases if income
convergence does not a¤ect the poorer median voter.
Proposition 2 has an interesting Corollary. We noticed that when 01 (m) < 0
and 02 (m) > 0, median votersincome disparity declines. Now, what happens when
they actually equalise? We nd the full convergence between median votersincomes
leads to opposite results depending on whether we are in situation (19) or (20), as
stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider the case where 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0 in which an
increase in m leads to median votersincome equalisation, y1 = y2, then government
size increases when j01 (m)j > j02 (m)j and declines when j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j.
The proof of the Corollary is straightforward after considering that median
voters income equalisation also leads to median voters net gains equalisation,
1 = 2, in Lemma 1.
According to case (19), government size increases when inter-regional income
equalisation occurs mainly because the median voter of the richer region is a poorer
one. In this case, inter-regional net gains equalisation is mainly driven by a lower
marginal cost for the richer median voter.
On the contrary, case (20) is not ambiguous anymore as dg

dm
< 0 when y1 = y2.
Thus, government size declines when inter-regional convergence occurs mainly be-
cause the median voter of the poorer region is a richer one. In this case, inter-regional
net gains from reaching an agreement tend to equalise too, but this equalisation is
mainly driven by a higher marginal cost for the poorer median voter. Therefore,
since the impact on the marginal cost of the richer median voter is less relevant, it
will be mutually convenient to agree on a lower g.
For completeness, we also note that when j01 (m)j = j02 (m)j then dg

dm
= 0 and
that cases (21) and (22) apply to the above Corollary.
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4.2 Migration and inter-regional divergence
Now, we turn to the last case in which the gap between median votersincomes and
marginal costs widens.
Proposition 3 Consider the case where 01 (m) > 0 and 
0
2 (m) < 0 in which an
increase in m leads the rich median voter to be a voter with a higher relative income
and the poorer median voter to be one with a lower relative income, the following
comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
< 0 if j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j , (23)
dg
dm
Q 0 if j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j . (24)
Besides, for the residual limit cases that have not been treated above, the following
comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
> 0 if 01 (m) = 0 and 
0
2 (m) < 0, (25)
dg
dm
< 0 if 01 (m) > 0 and 
0
2 (m) = 0, (26)
The proof is based on Lemma 1. Proposition 3 considers the case where 01 (m) >
0 and 02 (m) < 0. This, in turn, implies that
01(m)
21
> 0 and 
0
2(m)
22
< 0. Given that
relation (10) is always satised, expression (16) is positive when j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j.
On the contrary, the sign of expression (16) is ambiguous when j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j.
Besides, cases (25) and (26) are straightforward.
In the case under consideration, the incomes of the median voters of the two
regions diverge as median voter 1 becomes richer with respect to the mean and
median voter 2 becomes relatively poorer. In this situation, median voter 1 would
like to decrease the size of g because her marginal cost is now higher. Instead, median
voter 2 would like to increase g as she can benet from increased redistributive public
spending at a lower marginal cost. In addition, the poorer median voter has a higher
net gain from cooperating. While, the net gain is lower for median voter 1, which
restricts the set of possible agreements.
The situation where the change in the marginal cost is weakly greater for the
richer median voter, case (23) in the Proposition, is straightforward as it leads un-
ambiguously to a smaller public sector. The richer median voter sees her gains to
cooperate becoming smaller and uses this to gain bargaining power in the negotia-
tion, which allows her to impose her preference on public policy.
In case (24), where the change in the marginal cost is greater for the poorer
median voter, the impact on policy outcome is ambiguous. However, as case (25)
suggests, we can establish the sign of the comparative statics when 01 (m) = 0,
which unambiguously leads to dg

dm
> 0. Thus, if the income of the richer median
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voters does not change, median voter 2 will be able to renegotiate an increase in g.
Therefore, in case (24), in order to obtain a decrease in g, the interest of the richer
median voter to reduce the implementation of g must be su¢ ciently strong to win
the interest of the poorer median voter to increase it. Furthermore, as expected,
condition (26) states that the size of g decreases when the income of the poorer
median voter does not change.
5 Inter-regional migration and E¢ ciency
We conclude with a Proposition that compares the bargaining outcome with the
central planner solution. In order to do this, we distinguish two cases. In the rst
case y  y1  y2 and in the second case y1  y  y2. When y  y1  y2 both
median voters have income below the average income of the whole economy. This is
a standard assumption based on empirical evidence (see Meltzer and Richard 1981
and 1983 and others). However, since we have a model with two regions and two
median voters, this assumption could be violated by the richer median voter. For
this reason, we also consider the case where y1  y  y2, which could apply to some
developing countries situations.8 Empirical evidence suggests that median income
is above average income in Chinese cities and in the West Chinese coast and below
the mean in the countryside.
Proposition 4 Changes in m leads to the social optimum policy outcome when re-
gional median votersincome converges towards the mean income of the all economy;
i.e. when 1 = 2 = 1. On the contrary, when y  y1  y2 government spending
is over-provided and when y1  y  y2 government spending can be either over or
under-provided.
The proof is in the Appendix.
According to Proposition 4, any change in the population that leads to a uniform
distribution of income between and within regions generates an optimum policy
outcome from the social point of view.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the Proposition. The coincidence between the bar-
gaining and the social optimum solution is represented by the two thick curves in
gures 1 and 2. The two graphs put government size g on the horizontal axes, the
bargaining and the central planners rst order conditions and the regional median
voters net gains on the vertical axes. Specically, the vertical curves are the rst
order conditions and the parabolic curves the net gains. The thick parabolic curve in
gures 1 and 2 represent regional median voters net gains for the case 1 = 2 = 1.
In this case, the net gains are the same for both median voters. The point where
the vertical thick line is zero represents the size of g that maximizes surplus for
both median voters. This point coincide with the central planners solution. Thus,
8The other situations are either symmetric or empirically non relevant cases, which we do not
tackle. The interested reader could easily derive them.
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the vertical thick line represents both the central planners and the bargaining rst
order conditions. Now, the thin curves in gure 1 show the bargaining situation
for the case y  y1  y2. Specically, the smaller thin parabolic curve is the net
gain for the richest median voter and the larger thin curve is the net gain for the
poorer median voter. Thus, gure 1 shows what happens when we move away from
a situation where 1 = 2 = 1 to a situation where y  y1  y2. As we can see,
regional median voters do not have the same gain from cooperating anymore. Now,
both median voters have a greater convenience to rich an agreement over public
spending, but this convenience is bigger for the poorer median voter 2. The central
plannerrst order condition and, therefore, the social optimum size of g does not
change. Instead, the vertical thin lines represents the new bargaining rst order
condition. As we can see, there are several points where the bargaining rst or-
der condition is zero, but only the rst thin line is the unique bargaining solution
because it lies within the set where the net gains of both regional median voters
intersect. The graph shows that when regional median voters have both an income
below the average income, public spending is over-provided.
Graph 2 shows a situation where the bargaining outcome leads to under-provision.
This graph shows what may happen when the economy moves from a situation where
1 = 2 = 1 to a situation where y1  y  y2. Again, regional median voters now
have a di¤erent net gain from cooperating. However, di¤erently from gure 1, me-
dian voter 1 has now become not only richer than median voter 2, but also richer
than the voter with the average income. Therefore, if her convenience from coop-
erating becomes small enough compared with the situation of the poorer median
voter, the size of the public sector can decline, as shown in the particular simulation
in gure 2.
6 Conclusion
Inter-regional migration contributes to shaping geographical redistributive conicts
and inuences the nature of public spending. This paper presented a model where
migrants are not only treated as tax payers and consumers of public goods and
services, but also as voters. We pointed out that inter-regional migration changes the
distribution of the electorate in the electoral districts and interferes with centralised
policy formation.
This paper considered a multi-regional economy where the jurisdictional median
voters form a centralized government and negotiate over a common policy. Demo-
graphic variations bring about a change the median voters income relative to the
mean income of the economy. We see how this change either mitigates or deterio-
rates inter-jurisdictional redistributive conicts and how that in turn a¤ects the size
of the government.
Our analysis shows that four conceivable cases are possible under inter-regional
migration. The rst two cases, where jurisdictional median voters become simulta-
neously richer or poorer, are trivial as voter relocation does not worsen inter-regional
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redistributive conicts. Here, we found that government size increases when regional
median voters become poorer and declines when they become richer relative to the
mean income. Therefore, in these cases, Meltzer and Richard (1981) classical result
replicates also in a multi-region context.
However, the conict of interest arises when the income gap between regional
median voters declines or increases. In the third case, inter-regional migration leads
to convergence in regional median votersincomes. Policy outcome depends on who
has incurred the highest shock in the marginal cost. If income convergence occurs
mainly because the income, and consequently the marginal cost, of the median
voter of the richer region declines, then government size increases. On the contrary,
if income convergence occurs mainly because the income and marginal cost of the
median voter of the poorer region increases, then policy outcome is ambiguous.
However, in the latter situation, in the limit case where migration leads to income
equalization between regional median voters government size declines.
In the fourth case, inter-regional migration leads to divergence in the regional
median voters. Here, if divergence occurs because the rich median voter becomes a
richer one, then government spending declines. While, the size of the public sector
is more ambiguous when the divergence occurs because the poor median voter is a
poorer one. In this case, the poorer median voter would like to increase the size of
the public sector, while the richer median voter would like to shrink it. The nal
outcome depends on which one of the two conicting interests dominates.
The paper also studies whether and when inter-regional migration leads to the
social optimum policy outcome. We nd that migration leads to e¢ ciency when
it causes the election of regional median voters whose incomes not only equalise,
but also converge towards the average income of the all economy. This occurs, for
example, when migration leads to the equalitarian distribution of income between
and within regions. On the contrary, we found under-provision when all regional
median voters are poorer then the mean income voter. Besides, when a regional
median voter is richer and the other one is poorer than the average income voter,
we may get either under- or over-provision of public goods and services.
Furthermore, inter-jurisdictional migration shapes both intra- and inter-jurisdictional
distribution of income. In the context of this analysis, what we called Meltzer and
Richards (1981) and Giurannos (2009) e¤ects represent two very special cases.
Specically, inter-regional migration leads to Meltzer and Richards "intra-regional
inequality e¤ect" when intra-jurisdictional income inequality either increases or de-
creases simultaneously in both jurisdictions without altering inter-regional inequal-
ity. Giurannos "inter-regional inequality e¤ect" occurs when migration ows af-
fect the inter-jurisdictional distribution of income without altering intra-regional
inequality. In all those situations where migration a¤ects simultaneously inter- and
intra-jurisdictional inequalities, policy outcome changes in directions that are not
predictable by Melter and Richard (1981) and Giuranno (2009). Indeed, this paper
demonstrated how inter- and intra-regional inequality e¤ects interact when migra-
tion leads to either di¤erent marginal change in median voters incomes or when
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these changes take opposite signs; that is, our model generates predictions on pol-
icy outcome that cannot be made by Melter and Richards (1981) and Giurannos
(2009) models alone.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote by F the rst order condition (13),
F =
 1 (m) +H 0 (g)
 1 (m) g +H (g)
+
 2 (m) +H 0 (g)
 2 (m) g +H (g)
= 0. (27)
We want to study dg

dm
  Fm
Fg
. It is straightforward to verify that the second
order condition is negative, Fg < 0, while the numerator is
Fm =
 01 (m)1 + 01 (m) g @1@g
21
+
 02 (m)2 + 02 (m) g @2@g
22
. (28)
After rearranging we get
Fm =

01 (m)
21
+
02 (m)
22

( H (g) + gH 0 (g)) . (29)
Here, (gH 0 (g) H (g)) is negative because the marginal benet is smaller than the
average benet, i.e. H 0 (g) < H (g) =g.9 We conclude that Fm is positive when
01(m)
21
+
02(m)
22

is negative. This proves the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to prove the proposition, we rst show that
the bargaining solution leads to the e¢ cient solution when 1 = 2 = 1. In this case,
the bargaining rst order condition (13) becomes 2 1+H
0(g)
 g+H(g) = 0. This is satised
when H 0 (g) = 1, which coincides the social optimum solution (5). Second, consider
the case y  y1  y2. The social optimum condition (5) does not change when the
distribution of the electorate changes between regions. On the contrary, condition
(18) shows that the provision increases as the median mean income ratios declines
for both median voters. Third, consider the case y1  y  y2. The impact on
g of moving away from the situation 1 = 2 = 1 is explained by Proposition 3.
Therefore g may either increase or decrease.
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Figure 1: A case of over-provision when H(g) =
p
g; the thick curve shows the
bargaining equilibrium and the net gains when 1 = 2 = 1; the parameters for the
thin curves are 1 = 0:9 and 2 = 0:8.
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Figure 2: A case of under-provision when H(g) =
p
g; the thick curve shows the
bargaining equilibrium and the net gains when 1 = 2 = 1; the parameters for the
thin curves are 1 = 1:6 and 2 = 0:9.
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